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This paper assesses the potential for Africa’s ungoverned spaces to facilitate the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within Africa and beyond the continent. To 
those based outside Africa, the large areas of the region that lie outside the control of 
formal state institutions provide opportunities for the production of WMD precursors and 
the storage and transport of WMD-related materials (from precursors to weapons). To 
those based on the continent, however, the threat of WMD seems negligible. No 
countries currently pursue weapons programs of a biological, chemical, nuclear or 
radiological nature, and those that in the past have had state-sponsored WMD 
programs, South Africa and Libya, have either dismantled or are in the process of 
dismantling these programs. No states have indicated interested in pursuing WMD 
programs; few countries have the industrial bases necessary to produce large quantities 
of chemical or biological weapons (as opposed to precursors); and only one currently 
has nuclear capabilities (South Africa).  
If it exists, the threat would seem to come from the nexus of ungoverned spaces 
and how these areas create vulnerabilities that could be exploited by groups wishing to 
engage in WMD creation, storage or transport. This paper assesses the arguments for 
how “ungoverned spaces” in Africa could generate vulnerabilities to terrorism and create 
opportunities for the production, storage and transport of various forms of WMD. The 
paper represents a conceptual mapping of the issue space, rather than a detailed case 
study of actual examples with concrete evidence (of which there are precious few). The 
paper also considers the issues of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW).  
On balance, the analysis suggests that the opportunities are there, but currently 
not well exploited and in many cases, not likely to be exploited. There is some valid 
concern about the potential to engage in uranium trafficking (particularly in U-238 
yellowcake); though at present this seems to be the extent of the potential for 
ungoverned spaces to facilitate WMD proliferation.  
There are a few countries that have had some form of state-sponsored biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons programs in Africa in the past. Most of these have 
decommissioned their programs, though there have been allegations of recent chemical 
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weapons use by the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments. Aside from the state-
sponsored initiatives, there have been a few limited indications that there might be non-
state actors interested in creating or transporting biological, chemical or nuclear 
weapons within Africa.  On balance, at present the WMD threat is not significant. The 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons is much more prevalent throughout the 
continent than biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological weapons of mass 
destruction. Small arms and light weapons are a perennial threat to the stability of the 
continent, and most African conflicts have been exacerbated by an influx of weapons 
that have come into the continent after the end of the Cold War, and more recently, 
through primarily French and Chinese suppliers. 
Nevertheless, persistent concern with the WMD threat makes it worthwhile to 
consider whether and how groups could utilize Africa’s physical and non-physical 
ungoverned spaces to produce and transport WMD.  Opportunities could potentially 
arise from the porous borders, smuggling routes, unmonitored maritime passageways, 
and a matrix of localized conflicts that exacerbate the previous three dynamics. While 
there is only limited evidence that these vulnerabilities have been utilized for production 
and transportation, this paper runs through a conceptual mapping of how these 
vulnerabilities could create opportunities. The analysis finds that while there is cause for 
concern, it is tempered by larger issues involving targeting, capacity, ease and 
feasibility of transport, and motivation for use.  The intersection of ungoverned spaces 
and the potential for WMD proliferation – understood as production, transport and 
storage – creates a concern with what could be done should a group wish to, and on 
that front, the academics, policymakers and government officials all agree that if a group 
should want to transport WMD through Africa, it would be possible, though at this stage 
highly unlikely.  
 The paper concludes with a brief review of areas for future projects and research 
that DTRA-ASCO might want to pursue in the future on this subject.  
− A deeper investigation of ways that WMD can be produced, and of the African 
particularities here. While WMD seems an unlikely threat at present, the steady 
development of biological research and production facilities, and the interest in uranium 





− Launch a full investigation of the practicalities of transport across very difficult 
terrain that could easily compromise the integrity of biological and chemical material and 
weapons containers. Uranium ore is the most likely precursor material to find its way out 
of Africa through the ungoverned spaces, and is worth monitoring. Nuclear weapons 
would be more readily transported than biological or chemical weapons, but at this 
stage are the least likely form of WMD to be found on the continent.  
− Engage in a concrete mapping of facilities, groups, and specific locations where 
these dynamics all could take place, and then comprehensive analysis of the 
implications. 
− Initiate a dialog between area specialists and functional specialists, who often 
disagree about the extent of vulnerabilities to WMD trafficking and proliferation in Africa, 




Introduction: WMD in Africa? 
 
The potential that in Africa, the twin threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
proliferation and terrorism could merge to create a serious threat to America’s national 
security has captured the minds of many since President Bush’s State of the Union 
address in February 2002.  President Bush’s allegations that Saddam Hussein’s regime 
had been attempting to purchase supplies of uranium from Niger led to a series of 
investigations, though none were able to provide credible evidence that Hussein had, in 
fact, purchased uranium from this poor country in West Africa.1 Nevertheless, the 
episode fueled an ongoing interest about terrorism and illicit networks on the continent. 
Concerns that there could be WMD smuggling and proliferation were bolstered by the 
“ungoverned” nature of Africa:  large swathes of the continent and its people lay outside 
of the control of formal state agencies; borders are largely unpatrolled and un-
enforceable; and the governments that do exist are often run by individuals who regard 
public office as an economic commodity rather than a public duty. Therefore, many 
regard the continent as a twentieth century version of the Wild West, in which 
smugglers and terrorists can travel, base themselves and trade goods without detection 
or control.   
 At the same time as analysts in Washington and the rest of the USA tend to see 
Africa’s ungoverned spaces as an opportunity for terrorist exploitation and WMD 
trafficking, these concerns are met with skepticism when posed to US officials who are 
actually based in the continent. They and many others emphasize that there is a 
significant problem with small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), though this is not 
traditionally considered a form of WMD. Among those based in Africa there is little 
concern that there is an actual, WMD threat in any of the region’s countries. Even those 
countries that in the past have had state-sponsored WMD programs, South Africa and 
Libya, have either dismantled or are in the process of dismantling their biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons programs. None have professed an interest in pursuing 
WMD programs; few countries have the industrial base necessary to produce large 
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quantities of chemical or biological weapons (as opposed to precursors); and only one 
currently has nuclear energy or research capabilities (South Africa). 
Continuing concerns about the potential for WMD proliferation or usage in Africa 
relate to the fact that there are reported stockpiles of chemical weapons in Ethiopia; that 
there is rising interest in several African countries in acquiring nuclear power 
technology; and that many countries are currently prospecting for uranium deposits. At 
present, as the remainder of this paper will analyze, these threats are limited. Only 
South Africa currently has the industrial capacity, technological infrastructure and 
human capital necessary to operate and maintain nuclear energy facilities. Of the 
countries that are interested in developing nuclear energy capacity, most remain 
committed to a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Approximately 26 countries have 
signed the Pelindaba Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty first 
created in 1996 at the Organization of African Unity and currently administered by the 
African Union.2 The threat of biological, chemical and radiological weapons creation, 
development and usage is also limited.  
The question becomes, therefore, what is the potential for non-state groups that 
wish to traffic in WMD to exploit the vast territorial areas within Africa that lie beyond 
formal state control? After the initial scorn about the potential for WMD proliferation in 
Africa dies down, US officials in Africa often pause and speculate even though there are 
few targets within Africa for the use of WMD and few sites for the production of WMD, 
that if a group wanted to, it could probably move or produce precursors or full-scale 
WMD without detection.  This permissive climate is the prime reason why the question 
still arises. There is much vulnerability that organizations could exploit, even if difficult to 
do so, for the limited production and transport of biological, chemical or nuclear WMD. 
When considering SA/LW as also capable of creating mass casualties, the threats are 
much more concrete and prevalent.  
Before proceeding, a brief review of definitions for the terms as used in the rest 
of the paper is in order. Following the terminology adopted by the US Department of 
Defense (DoD), the phrase weapons of mass destruction refers to “weapons that are 
capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to 
destroy large numbers of people;” they may be biological, chemical, nuclear or 
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radiological in nature.3 Small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) could also be included in 
this definition, as they are also capable of mass destruction, but due to the fact that 
SA/LW are used differently and require more personal involvement in the deployment of 
the weapons, they remain distinct from the originating concept behind the phrase 
“weapons of mass destruction.”  
The DoD definition of proliferation is limited to nuclear: “The process by which 
one nation after another comes into possession of, or into the right to determine the use 
of, nuclear weapons; each nation becomes potentially able to launch a nuclear attack 
upon another nation.”4 This work will take a more concrete view of proliferation, using it 
to refer to the (1) the production of precursors to WMD; (2) the development or 
acquisition of biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological material intended to be used 
as or developed into a weaponized form; (3) the transport of this material, or (4) the 
development and transport of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. In other words, 
the paper primarily discusses proliferation in terms of the production, storage and 
transport of various forms of and precursors to WMD. This is designed to capture the 
potential to exploit Africa’s natural resources and biological diversity for the purpose of 
assisting in the generation of weapons of mass destruction. In this paper, proliferation 
does not include the spread of expertise or initiation of research that could lead a 
country to develop a WMD program. 
 
Ungoverned Spaces and Terrorism 
Failed states and ungoverned spaces are often used as synonymous concepts, 
referring to geographic areas where state authorities do not exercise effective control.5 
Yet there are many manifestations of ungoverned spaces, most of which do not involve 
the full-fledged failure of a state. Failed states, in the genuine sense of an absolute 
collapse or lack of any formal governance structures, are actually rather rare in the 
world. Africa is thought to be full of ungoverned spaces because state authorities are 
notoriously weak, countries include vast territorial expanses whose remote and 
challenging terrain would be difficult to monitor and control (if the states were capable), 
and borders are virtually un-enforceable and unpatrollable (due to natural terrain, 
nomadic populations, and ethnic groups that span borders). These are the physical 
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dimensions of ungoverned spaces. In turn, ungoverned spaces – conceived as areas 
outside of state control – are thought to facilitate terrorist recruitment and operation, and 
thus to pose a significant security threat.  
Looking beyond the association of ungoverned spaces with state failure opens 
up the analysis to a broad array of alternative governance systems, and then to how 
these can impact on the formation and operation of “terrorist” movements. Often there is 
order within apparent chaos, but it is an order that escapes the notice of the Western 
observer, because it may rely on localized, traditional or non-formal systems of 
governance. Alternatively, many issues of “ungovernance” are intentional inversions of 
authority, where a state purposely seeks to control only a small geographical or 
functional area within the territory of the state.  
Students of African politics have long discussed these various permutations of 
governance and authority, long before the concept of failed states and ungoverned 
spaces became commonplace terms in academic and policy analyses. Jackson and 
Rosberg early on discussed the concept of the empirical and the juridical in African 
politics, noting how the geographical expression of statehood, upheld by the 
international system predicated on nation-states, belied the reality of governance in 
Africa on the ground. States, in their analysis, really referred to capital cities linked to 
productive economic sites within a territorial expression, rather than to an actual 
extension of governance structures throughout a territory.6 A generation of Africanist 
scholars has come to treat the difference between the juridical concept of the state and 
its empirical reality on the ground as the basic starting point for all analyses of African 
politics.  
The concept of ungoverned space is therefore best treated not just as a 
geographical expression, but also one of authority and political will. Central state 
leaders may not even try to project their power to the periphery of countries, willfully 
leaving large swathes of territory outside the purview of formal state structures. Instead, 
as Reno points out, state leaders may intentionally opt to control only specific 
geographic zones that contain lucrative resources, allowing the rest of the territory to be 
governed through localized forms of governance.7 Effective sovereignty, therefore, is 
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intentionally restricted to specific geographical locations that are economically 
productive.  
Other governments may rely on the grey areas of patronage and corruption to 
maintain their power, and thus be unwilling to completely enforce the laws that are on 
the books. States, therefore, may intentionally undermine the rule of law, which yet 
again is completely different than the softening of sovereignty that occurs when 
alternative forms of governance challenge state authority. Vigilante groups, organized 
criminal networks, or international bodies that exert control over a country’s economic 
policies unintentionally soften the sovereignty of a state, often causing the state to score 
lowly on any measure of formal governance.8  Finally, when nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations enter into a country and 
begin to provide services, they are taking over roles that states traditionally have filled, 
further enabling the state to restrict its engagement with the citizenry. These are three 
examples of ungoverned spaces that derive from a lack of political will to fully control 
the polity.  
 In this sense, creating a more flexible definition of the ungoverned space is 
similar to the long debate on the concept of “state strength,” most recently expressed by 
Francis Fukuyama. Aside from the early works that pushed the idea of state 
responsibilities beyond the simple provision of law and order to include the functions of 
the welfare state, Fukuyama expressly depicted state strength in two distinct 
dimensions:  scope versus capacity. States decide how many functions to undertake 
(scope) and are able to fulfill functions with varying degrees of success 
(capacity/strength).9  
Interestingly, the United States DoD has long nuanced the concept of 
ungoverned spaces to reflect all of these issues. Under Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Africa Theresa Whelan’s influence, the DoD has moved the concept of 
ungoverned spaces from the early formulations that focused on just physical control 
over territory to incorporate notions of political will. According to the DoD, an 
ungoverned space is a “physical or non-physical area where there is an absence of 
state capacity or political will to exercise control.”10 The full concept refers to areas 
where territories are physically uncontrolled or functional policy areas in which 
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governments have ceded control, often allowing other organizations to take over the 
provision of services and functions that the government, in conventional and Western 
understandings, should be providing. 
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 Table One: The Full DoD Definition of Ungoverned Spaces11 
Ungoverned Territories Rugged, remote, maritime or littoral 







Competing Governance A sovereign state’s inability or 
unwillingness to exercise authority over 
part or whole of a country.  
Exploitation of Legal Principles Areas in which legal norms and 
processes can be exploited by actors 









Opaque Areas of Activity Areas created by the inability of a 
government to monitor or control 
certain illicit or facilitating transactions 
when they are conducted in a certain 
way.  
 
In this paper, the analysis will be primarily concerned with the potential intersection of 
terrorism and WMD proliferation within this physical concept of ungoverned space.  
 
The Ungoverned Spaces Paradigm and the African State 
The issue of territorial governance has long bedeviled Africa’s states. Jackson and 
Rosberg most effectively analyzed the effects of the disjuncture between the maps 
drawn by European colonizers, the central state authorities created at independence, 
and the reality of control in most African states in their classic analysis of the diverging 
“empirical” and “juridical” aspects of African states.12 Despite the fact that most 
territorial boundaries had no relevance on the ground, frequently dividing ethnic groups 
between countries, post-colonial elites embraced the European model of the state and 
territory that had been implanted during colonization. There were a variety of reasons 
for this, but perhaps most compelling was that the nation-state created a center of 
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power for the post-colonial elites independent of the more complex network of
colonial governance systems.
 pre-
n Unity 13 At its founding in 1962 the Organization of Africa
elevated the sancticity of the continent’s borders to a core principle. Member states 
were not to interfere in the internal affairs of their sovereign brethren, nor would the 
OAU support the activities of any country that attempted to align territorial boundaries 
with lived-realities.  
While the artificial borders of most countries created the first hurdle to effective 
governance, the extractive impulse that governed the design of infrastructure and the 
location of cities further compounded the problem. Colonial rulers had designed roads, 
railways and other infrastructure to facilitate resource extraction, rather than to link rural 
and urban communities in a way that facilitated effective governance, and post-colonial 
elites did little to change these patterns. Roads and railways were designed to take 
resources and get them out of the country, rather than to facilitate internal 
communication, interaction and integration. In fact, communication and interaction 
would have helped the nascent nationalist movements in the colonial era, and thus 
threatened colonial systems. At independence, therefore, elites inherited an apparatus 
that intentionally did not incorporate rural and peripheral areas into a coherent national 
unit. Similarly, capital cities were established near coastlines or in the domains of the 
ethnic groups that the colonizers appointed as rulers, rather than in central locations 
from which rulers could project power to the periphery. Post independence rulers 
quickly realized the benefits of these extractive apparatuses and in most countries 
continued the extractive policies of their former colonial masters.  
“The notion that Africa was ever comprised of sovereign states classically 
defined as having a monopoly on force in the territory within their boundaries is false. 
Most colonial states did not make any effort to extend the administrative apparatus of 
government much beyond the capital city,” and colonial governments were, in most 
cases, “little more than ‘elementary bureaucracies with limited personnel…more 
comparable to rural country governments in Europe than to modern independent 
states.”14 After independence, African countries did try to extend the administrative 
reach of the state, but were always more focused on the urban populations. With few 
exceptions (those being Rwanda and South Africa), therefore, African central 
governments simply never had the capacity to govern their territories. 
During the 1970s and 80s, the limited degree of state capacities were further 
eroded by economic mismanagement and ensuing financial difficulties, corruption and a 
forced down-sizing of the state under structural adjustment programs (particularly in the 
1980s). In response, societies adapted to the diminished state presence by renewing 
informal politics, adapting to the decline in already thin service provision.15 Into the 
vacuum stepped informal traders, smugglers, warlords, arms traffickers, youth militia, 
local civic organizations, women’s organizations, and religious groups. Each element 
operated with “varying degrees of autonomy, interacting with state agencies and the 
external community – aid agencies, international donors, and international non-
governmental organizations.”16 
This is not to label the African state completely inept, for at times most states 
were able to control certain territorial areas, regulate the formal economies, and create 
strong military forces that were capable of quelling internal dissent for long periods of 
time. Strong and capable states like South Africa and Rwanda, for example, were able 
to completely regulate their territories and peoples, with infamous results. The Hutu 
government in Rwanda produced detailed lists of virtually every street in the country, 
listing, household-by-household, who was Tutsi and who was Hutu. The South African 
government under apartheid erected one of the most elaborate and enforced systems of 
racial and ethnic classification and segregation that the world has ever experienced. 
There are also positive forms of strong governance: Botswana also has a capable state 
that actually governs both the polity and the economy, with beneficial economic and 
social benefits.  
The point is to demonstrate that the current obsession with the “new” nature of 
state failure (to paraphrase Robert Rotberg), is not really new in Africa at all, and that 
there have long been hybrid forms of governance in both the center and periphery of 
most African countries. In this sense, the situation in Africa parallels insights offered by 
Phil Williams, who writes that the  
story of medieval Wales is a cautionary tale for any attempt to analyze 
ungoverned spaces or lawless areas. While some of these spaces are 
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truly lawless and ungoverned, many of them simply have different, 
alternative, and sometimes even hybrid forms of governance. The terms 
we use are inherently state-centric and implicitly assume that the state, 
based as it is on centralized, top-down control and direction, better meets 
peoples’ needs than any other form of governance.17 
   
The current concern with ungoverned spaces - unpatrolled borders; unsecured littoral 
areas, coastlines and maritime passageways; and the unregulated trading/smuggling 
routes that cross the continent – constitutes an ahistorical discussion that seems to 
present these problems as new issues that a quick-fix, military-spearheaded capacity-
building effort can solve.  
The current analysis of how ungoverned spaces create “challenges” for Africa, 
therefore, represents a relatively simple mapping of how these problems manifest, with 
little attention to the underlying factors that create the problems. As depicted in table 
two, the DoD sees similar challenges across virtually all the regions: porous borders, 
unpatrolled coastlines, conflicts between and within countries, ineffective governments, 
and poor infrastructure and service provision (particularly in the health care sector).18   
 
Table Two: DoD Mapping of Ungoverned States in Africa19 












- Long unguarded 
coastline 





- (Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Somalia) 
- Lack of adequate 
health care 










- Poor health 
- Long unguarded 
coastline 
- Poor health care 
systems 
- High HIV/AIDS 
rate 
- Growing gap 
between rich 
and poor 




- Terrorist safe 
havens and 
bases (Mali) 





 care systems 
- Corruption 
- Lack of 
infrastructure 
 
of capabilities do 
not match reality 
 
 
Even taking this at face value, there remain factors that the paradigm should consider, 
such as localized pastoral conflicts that cross international borders; historical nomadic 
routes that transverse the Sahel and connect East Africa to the Middle East; and 
internal dynamics that create advantaged and disadvantaged populations that are often 
ethnically and religiously delimited.  
 
 Terrorism in Africa 
But are there terrorist groups in Africa that are interested and attempting to capitalize on 
all these vulnerabilities? A casual reading of major newspapers would create the 
impression that there are so many physically ungoverned spaces in Africa that terrorists 
are running rampant across the continent. Terrorists are said to hide out in the multiple 
lawless and stateless areas that populate Sub-Saharan Africa, they supposedly gain 
recruits from among the starving and displaced masses who have been victimized by 
powerful warlords and governments that are fighting over the continent’s spoils. Militant 
Islamic recruiters are thought to prey on vulnerable communities, building radical 
organizations and recruiting the next generation of suicide bombers from the ranks of 
the poor Africans. 
This is, to state it mildly, a vast oversimplification of both the nature of terrorist 
recruitment and the terrorist threat in Africa. First of all, organized terrorist groups no not 
rampantly proliferate across the continent. Prior to 2001, there were no designated 
“foreign terrorist organizations” in Sub-Saharan Africa.20 There have been a number of 
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organizations that area governments label as “terrorists,” yet the United States has 
been hesitant to recognize the groups as such, for the understandable reason that in 
many cases, area governments are labeling opposition groups terrorists in order to gain 
support to combat their opponents.  
Second, these sentiments are an overstatement of the influence of militant Islam 
across the continent, and a misunderstanding of the nature of terrorism. Terrorism in 
Africa is not confined to the realm of the radical Islamists, though those are the groups 
that receive the most attention. Of the three Sub-Saharan groups that have found their 
way onto the “other designated organizations” lists maintained by the State Department, 
only one (Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya, AIAI, of Somalia), was Islamist.21 The other two 
included the former military of Rwanda (the ex-FAR) and a Christian terrorist group in 
Uganda, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). Al-Qaeda, obviously on the list of 
designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), operates in Africa, but is not from 
Africa.  
Third, the common mantra that failed states lead to terrorism is, in fact, belied by 
geography: the groups that do exist tend to organize in the countries with a modicum of 
law and order, such as South Africa and Kenya. Indigenous terrorist organizations (not 
designated by the United States) have originated and continue to operate in both 
unstable countries such as Somalia and Liberia, but they are more prolific in the 
territories that have more advanced infrastructures, such as South Africa, Nigeria and 
Kenya. Without a reliable and secure commercial infrastructure, it becomes difficult to 
move commodities and illicit goods to fund terrorist activities, to access the internet and 
make phone calls. The largest Al-Qaeda network in East Africa was uncovered in 
Kenya, one of the most politically stable and industrially advanced countries in the 
region. In fact, to date this cell has been the only direct Al-Qaeda group that has been 
uncovered since the Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in 2001.  
Terrorist groups tend to use the failed states like Somalia more as staging 
grounds and transit points, rather than places where the groups build long-term 
organizational and financial networks. The stateless societies often have dense local 
networks that actually regulate society, and foreigners stand out starkly in this context. 
There simply is no way for a foreigner to blend into Somali society: even the Ethiopian-
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born Somalis (who look the same and speak the same language) can be easily 
identified as outsiders once they begin to speak. The Harmony Project at the Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point has provided excellent data on the organizational 
difficulties that Al-Qaeda faced in Somalia, which eventually led to the organization 
reducing its involvement in the territory.22 The same is true of Pemba, the smaller of the 
two islands off the coast of mainland Tanzania, and once thought to be a haven for 
terrorists.  
Unlike in West Africa, where Hezbollah was able to enter into the chaos of Sierra 
Leone and engage in a lucrative diamond trade, in East Africa, whether stateless or 
semi-governed, foreign recruiters have had to marry into local communities before they 
can begin to gain any recruits. Furthermore, even in West Africa, while Hezbollah 
obtains diamonds from conflict zones and near anarchic territories, the organization 
found it necessary to transport the product via the Lebanese diaspora community that 
lived in the more politically controlled countries and maintained stable trading 
networks.23 
 Finally, when understanding the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa, it is 
important to note that there are distinct regional variations to the presence and extent of 
terrorist networks across Africa. The threat in Southern and Central Africa is almost 
non-existent, and for a clear reason: there are relatively few Muslims in Central and 
Southern Africa. In these areas, Islamists are attempting to convert Christians to Islam, 
rather than developing radical Islamist networks.24 With the exception of South Africa, 
there simply is no Islamist terrorism to discuss. There is little non-Islamic terrorism 
either, now that the liberation struggles and civil wars in the South have ended and the 
Rwandan Army disbanded. 
Islam is much more prevalent in Northern, Eastern and Western Africa, and 
accordingly there are more Islamist groups, both radical and non-radical, in these areas 
than farther south. The LRA of Uganda is also active, and a current designated terrorist 
organization, though Christian, rather than Moslem. Therefore, when discussing the 
terrorist threat and the potential nexus between terrorism and WMD proliferation, 
regional variations in the number of groups, intensity of their activities and the nature of 
the Islamist terrorist threat, are important.  
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In both East and West Africa, Islam as a political ideology has capitalized on 
ethno-national struggles to create a potent force.25 Focusing on West and Sahelian 
Africa, the US Government is concerned with the activities of Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and 
a host of localized organizations, most notably the Salafist Group for Prayer and 
Combat (GSPC).26 In 2006, the GSPC reportedly merged with Al-Qaeda, emerging with 
the new name Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). According to the 2006 patterns 
of terrorism report compiled by the Department of State, throughout 2006,  
AQIM/GSPC continued to operate in the Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-
patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad to 
recruit extremists within the region for training and terrorist operations in 
the Trans-Sahara and, possibly, for operations outside the region. Its new 
alliance with al-Qaida potentially has given it access to more resources 
and training.27  
 
Tabliqhi Islamic sects, which themselves are nonviolent, recruit individuals in a 
missionary style that focuses on socially isolated young men. From these individuals, 
radical groups then recruit terrorists. For example, John Walker Lindh, the American 
Taliban soldier arrested in 2001, had been a member of a Tabliqhi sect before 
becoming radicalized.  Radical groups have also been able to capitalize on local 
struggles for power and influence, as with the recruitment of militants from the Tuareg 
group in Mauritania and Mali.28 Nigeria has seen major increases in sectarian strife and 
militarized Islam in recent years, further contributing to rising concern in the Western 
and Sahelian regions. Attacks against Western oil companies in the Niger Delta, 
however, come not from Islamist organizations, but from ethnic-nationalist movements 
seeking a more equitable share of oil revenues, to compensate for the environmental 
degradation wreaked by oil pipelines. They also happen to be devout Christians.  
East Africa attracted special interest from the United States and the international 
community because of its early links to transnational Islamic terrorism. In 1998, United 
States Embassies in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya) were bombed, 
killing a handful of US citizens and hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians. Sudan and 
Somalia have both served as training grounds and transit routes for Al-Qaeda, and the 
agents who attacked the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were closely linked to cells 
in Sudan and Somalia. In the wake of the embassy bombings, an organized Al-Qaeda 
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cell was uncovered in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2002, one of Kenya’s most popular tourist 
destinations, Mombasa, experienced two further terrorist strikes, this time in the form of 
coordinated and simultaneous attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel popular with Western 
tourists (in Kikambala) and an Israeli-chartered aircraft departing from the Mombasa 
airport. 
 Most importantly, East Africa has also been home to both Al-Qaeda and Osama 
Bin Laden. Al-Qaeda’s presence in the eastern region is both direct, with agents 
operating in several countries, as well as indirect, through the creation of satellite 
organizations and the recruitment of existing organizations to Al-Qaeda’s cause. In 
1991 the leader of Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) government, Hassan al Turabi, 
invited Osama bin Laden to live in Sudan. During this time, bin Laden established 
multiple businesses in Sudan, many of which he retains, and established Al-Qaeda 
training camps in the more remote areas.29 During this time, Sudan provided both 
training camps and a source of financial support for Al-Qaeda during the early 1990s 
and fostered Islamic resistance movements in several neighboring countries in the Horn 
of Africa. As a result, the United States listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism 
from 1993 until 2006.  
With the support of the Sudanese government, bin Laden created the Islamic 
Army Shura, which he intended to function as a coordinating body for a consortium of 
terrorist groups allied to bin Laden.30 In the wake of the bombings of the US embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, the United States controversially destroyed a 
pharmaceutical factory (Shira) in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan.31 Groups from 
Somalia and Eritrea were formally associated with Islamic Army Shura, and informal ties 
were established with groups in Uganda and several West African states. Al-Qaeda has 
increased its direct presence in much of East Africa during recent years, extending from 
Sudan in the north to Tanzania, and perhaps even into Malawi in the south, which is 
why the region increasingly figures in US counterterrorism efforts.32 
Despite this permissive environment, the indigenous terrorist threat in much of 
Africa has not been considered a major threat in by the US government, as these 
groups have rarely sought to directly attack the US or its interests (aside from the three 
incidents listed above). The bulk of supposed-terrorist organizations throughout Africa 
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are those that originated in specific areas and operate with local or regional agendas, 
and the two designated FTOs were not even Islamist (the Lords Resistance Army in 
Uganda, and the Rwandan Armed Forces). For example, the Ogadeni National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia originated as a Somali nationalist movement, 
seeking to rejoin the Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with the country of 
Somalia. As with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the northern part of the country, 
the ONLF’s Islamist agenda comes second to the nationalist.  
In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, most of the local Islamist groups seek to 
advance the status of Muslims in each country, rather than to seek the creation of an 
Islamic state.33  Many of these groups existed before Al-Qaeda attempted to organize 
them into a loose hierarchy, and so far these local groups have not become deeply 
entrenched in the Al-Qaeda network. The most important obstacle to a closer alliance 
has been that local Islamist groups have a primary loyalty to their clans and ethnic tribes 
that has not always been compatible with Al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda. 34 Local 
Islamist groups are primarily concerned with the overthrow of their governments, and 
they focus on destabilizing neighboring governments in order to assist their ethnic 
compatriots that were stranded across the state borders established by colonial powers.  
With such locally-delimited agendas, not only are these groups of only limited 
concern to the international community, it is also difficult for transnational terrorist 
organizations to successfully recruit them to the international radical Islamist agenda. 
Transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah find it difficult to 
coordinate activities with local groups and have mostly given up attempting to organize 
them into larger associations and networks.35 These difficulties are most extreme in 
East Africa, where the transnational groups find the clan-based warfare and seeming 
anarchy of acephalous societies like Somalia difficult terrain in which to recruit and 
prosper.36  
In West Africa, Al-Qaeda has experienced more success in co-opting local 
groups into a larger agenda, though the local struggle for recognition and opportunity 
still often dominates the goals of the groups.37 Furthermore, the Sahelian and West 
African states have a longstanding tradition of strict separation between religion and the 
state, growing out of compromises made by the leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods during 
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the colonial era. As a result, most populations and area governments do not seek to 
merge religion and politics, which complicates the work of those advancing an Islamist 
agenda. In this context, religion has served as a basis of political struggle and 
legitimacy, in the context of contestation over political control. For example, Islamist 
movements have emerged out of the Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Islamist preaching 
has found most response amongst the Haratine living in poor suburbs of Nouakachott in 
Mauritania.38 
 
Terrorists, Ungoverned Spaces and WMD Proliferation 
 
How, then, do we map the concern with terrorist onto the concern with ungoverned 
spaces, and then both of these onto the threat of WMD proliferation? Part of the 
exercise must take into account the fact that while the terrorist threat may not be as 
extensive as the US government and popular pundits claim, there has been an increase 
in militant Islamism across the continent in recent years. Conflicts in Nigeria, the recent 
rise of the Islamic Courts Union (also known as the Council of Islamic Courts) in 
Somalia, and the vulnerabilities to recruitment created by pervasive conflict zones, 
attest to the increasing influence that Islamists have on the continent. 
 
Experiences with WMD on the Continent and the SA/LW Threat 
At present, no African states currently have proven, active nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons programs, though several have in the past and several are 
suspected of having active programs currently. Small arms and light weapons constitute 
the real weapons of mass destruction in the African context. For this reason, when 
discussing WMD in Africa, some analysts will use the phrase WMD but refer to SA/LW 
rather than the more traditional NBC – nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
Because of this tendency, in addition to discussing the WMD potential I will also review 
the SA/LW threat and how that can be mapped onto the vulnerabilities created by 
ungoverned spaces and the permissiveness introduced by corruption and the illicit 
economy. As a reminder of how these terms are used in this paper, for the most part the 
discussion revolves around the potential for the production, storage and transport of 
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various forms of and precursors to WMD.  When treating SA/LW, for the most part the 
analysis revolves around issues of its prevalence and trafficking (transport).  
 
State-Sponsored Biological, Chemical, Nuclear and Radiological Weapons Programs 
There are a few countries that have had some form of state-sponsored biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons programs in Africa in the past. Most of these have 
decommissioned their programs, though there have been allegations of recent chemical 
weapons use by the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments. Table three lists the 
countries in Africa that the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey 
Institute for International Studies (MIIS) has identified as having current, past or 
potential CW or BW programs.  
 
Table Three: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs in African States39  

















Algeria Possible[3] Unknown 01/13/93 08/14/95  Research effort, but 
no evidence of 
production[4] 
Unknown No No 




No No Likely maintains an 
offensive 
program[14] 
Unknown[15] No No 
Ethiopia Probable[16] Unknown 01/14/93 05/13/96 - - 04/10/72 05/26/75 


































Sudan Possible[66] Unknown No 05/24/99* Possible research 
program[67] 
Unknown No No 
 
 South Africa decommissioned its CBW program in the late 1980s, as the end of 
apartheid approached. South Africa does utilize nuclear energy plants, and has 
uranium stores in its territory. As a well-governed and regulated state, the degree 
to which this represents a proliferation threat is questionable.  There are lingering 
concerns regarding the potential to exploit dual-use technologies in this 
industrialized country, and regarding the potential sale of chemical weapons that 
have evaded the control of the current regime.  
 Libya announced in December 2003 that it would decommission its chemical and 
nuclear weapons program (it had never really had a biological weapons 
program). The nuclear facilities were completely dismantled, and equipment 
shipped to various locations around the USA, in 2004. The large stockpile of 
mustard gas created by Libya’s chemical weapons program is still in the process 
of being disposing of. Libya’s two chemical weapons facilities at Rabata and 
Tarkunah supposedly shut down their operations over a decade ago. The Rabata 
facility produced over 100 tons of blister and nerve agents before it closed in 
1990, and the underground facility at Tarkunah was re-opened in 1995 as a 
pharmaceutical plant. The Libyan biological weapons program was at a basic 
stage when decommissioned in 2000, and was not able to produce weaponized 
agents.  
 Ethiopia was suspected of having a chemical weapons program since the 1970s, 
and to have used the products against both Eritrea and Somalia during the 
1970s. The chemicals were primarily incapacitating agents, but there have been 
allegations that the USSR provided nerve agents as well.40 These allegations are 
neither widespread nor well documented. Ethiopia is still discovering containers 
of mustard gas left over from the Italian occupation in the 1930s. Italy denies 
responsibility for the items that are found. The latest was uncovered in 2001 
while laying the foundation for a school in northern Ethiopia.  
 Sudan has been accused of utilizing chemical weapons in the Darfur conflict, 
though these claims have yet to be widely substantiated and verified. The Shifa 
pharmaceutical community that the US bombed in 1998 was suspected of 
producing chemical weapons and a precursor to the VX agent (EMTP), but 
again, the evidence is inconclusive and the site does not seem to have had the 
security or containment provisions that a large-scale chemical weapons facility 
would mandate.41  
 
Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation 
The proliferation of SA/LW, which does not require state sponsorship, is much more 
prevalent throughout the continent than the more standard weapons of mass 
destruction (biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological weapons). Small arms and 
light weapons are a perennial threat to the stability of the continent, and most African 
conflicts have been exacerbated by an influx of weapons that have come into the 
continent after the end of the Cold War, and more recently, through primarily French 
and Chinese suppliers.42 
 SA/LW has the potential to transform small, localized disputes into much larger 
conflict zones. Currently the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the 
Horn of Africa monitors several clusters of cross-border pastoral conflicts through its 
Conflict and Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN). CEWARN has noted 
that the prevalence of SA/LW in the border clusters between Somalia, Kenya and 
Ethiopia and between Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda has enabled low-level insurgencies 
in those regions to persist for a long period of time, as arms smugglers take advantage 
of local level conflicts to transport their weapons.43 These weapons can then find their 
way into more stable countries that have a more persistent terrorist threat, and from 
there to be used for other ends.  
 There are localized disputes in every sub-region on the African continent, and 
many of these occur in peripheral areas. The ability of governments to control these 
areas, already weakened, becomes even more tenuous when localized disputes are 
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elevated into regional insurgencies through the influx of SA/LW. Mapping these areas 
onto the areas of exploitation open to terrorists clearly demonstrates the very real threat 
that SA/LW proliferation – both its transport and use – opens up for terrorist movement 
and operations, as they can exploit the local insurgencies and/or use the contested 
areas as transport corridors.  
 
Non-State Sponsored WMD Proliferation 
Aside from the state-sponsored initiatives, there have been some indications that there 
might be non-state actors interested in creating or transporting biological, chemical or 
nuclear weapons within Africa. For example, AQ Khan is reported to have made three 
trips to Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Nigeria, spanning from February 1998 to 2000, 
though it is an open question whether he made the visits to obtain uranium for 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program or to liaise with Tablighi missionaries, who had 
started arriving in Mali in 1997-8.44  
 Questions about the AQ Khan network’s involvement in Western and Southern 
Africa leads one to investigate the ways in which terrorist groups could utilize Africa’s 
physical ungoverned spaces to produce and transport WMD.  Opportunities could 
potentially arise from the porous borders, smuggling routes, unmonitored maritime 
passageways, and a matrix of localized conflicts that exacerbate the previous three 
dynamics. While there is only limited evidence that these vulnerabilities have been 
utilized for production and transportation, it is worth considering how they might be 
exploited. 
 First, the continent’s pervasive porous borders present areas through which 
anyone can move anything, should they want to. As the Defense Attaché in Nigeria 
phrased it during an interview with the author in April 2007 in Abuja, “Do I think there’s 
WMD proliferation in Nigeria? No. However, is there the potential and opportunity for it? 
Yes. You can get anything into and out of this country.” He stressed that Nigerians are 
not currently interested in any form of WMD proliferation, and that right now the 
country’s Muslims are not radicalized in that way, but that some parts of the country 
could in the future get to the point where any spark would set them off. If that would 
happen, then the possibilities would open up.   
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William Reno’s work in Western Africa has demonstrated that often rebels seek 
to physically control territories that contain productive resources (timber and rubber 
plantations, mines, oil extraction sites, etc) rather than an entire state.45 These locations 
are often in remote parts of the countries well outside of formal government control, so 
that transport of sensitive material across the already porous borders could be more 
easily facilitated. This points us to examine the location of mines that might contain 
sensitive materials and to speculate (1) whether the simple presence of the mines might 
cause instability because they are attractive to potential rebels, and (2) whether this 
instability might then provide opportunities for trafficking in precursors and materials for 
nuclear WMD. Uranium mines in ungoverned areas are particularly vulnerable to 
exploitation, as demonstrated by an attack on the Cominak uranium mine in 
northwestern Niger in June 2008 by Tuareg rebels. While there is no indication that the 
rebels intended to steal and transport any of the uranium, the incident did point to a 
clear risk for the security of the facility and the materials it contains.46 Decommissioned 
uranium mines are also at risk: in 2005 Tanzanian authorities reported confiscating a 
barrel of yellowcake (U-238) that had allegedly been smuggled out of a closed uranium 
mine in the Katanga region of the Democratic Republic of Congo.47 Since uranium can 
be produced as a byproduct of other mining, one must consider the potential 
vulnerability of all mining sites in Africa.  
Second, widespread smuggling routes for goods and people could potentially be 
utilized by potential traffickers of WMD or their precursors. Smuggling routes not only 
provide transportation routes for groups, they also offer opportunities for the groups to 
financially sustain themselves. For example, the GSPC survived in the southern 
Algerian/northern Malian region through cigarette smuggling and hostage ransom.48  
There have been links between Hezbollah and the diamond trade in Western Africa; as 
well as rumored links between AQ and the diamond trade, primarily in Sierra Leone. 
These linkages set a precedent for other groups to move high-value commodities, such 
as precursors for or weapons of mass destruction.49 Routes across the Sahel, 
originating in Niger and northern Mali, which bring Cameroonians, Congolese, 
Ghanaians and Liberians through a trans-Sahara trade route into the Mediterranean, 
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could be used to transport individuals carrying biological or small quantities of chemical 
agents, as well as small arms.  
This is a noted problem in Eastern Africa as well, as the nomadic people in each 
country migrate within countries and across international borders. To take just a few 
groups in the diverse Eastern African region, the Afar people migrate between Djibouti 
and Ethiopia; while the Somalis migrate between at least three countries: Somalia and 
Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, and Somalia and Ethiopia. Given that many of these 
individuals are fleeing from persecution or wars, they become vulnerable both to 
terrorist recruitment and are in need of economic opportunities, so are likely to be willing 
to smuggle goods along their routes. This could present an opportunity for the 
movement of WMD, and it already provides for the transport of SA/LW.  
Refugee flows within regions and out of the continent constitute additional 
migratory vulnerabilities. In Djibouti, for example, Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees 
depart in large numbers from Djibouti en route to the Middle East via Yemen. The 
Yemeni authorities accept these refugees and permit them to transit through the country 
into the broader Middle East. At present, this flow is mainly from East Africa to the 
Middle East, which would provide for the outflow of WMD from Africa, rather than an 
inflow.  
Third, the unmonitored maritime passageways along the Eastern and Western 
coasts already provide major opportunities for both piracy and smuggling into and out of 
Africa, which already facilitate the flow of SA/LW, could provide opportunities for the 
transport of biological, chemical and nuclear WMD. Again, there is as yet no evidence of 
this, but the potential is worth considering. Narcotics trafficking from West Africa 
became a major problem in the 1990s, at times leading to the suspension of all 
commercial air traffic from Lagos, Nigeria to the United States. The trade continues 
today, and is complemented by a vibrant market in illegal oil bunkering in the Gulf of 
Guinea. While certain governments are complicit in the smuggling of oil, other actors in 
these trade flows are more shadowy, leading to an intersection of legality, illegality, 
corruption and smuggling that creates an obvious opportunity for WMD trafficking. The 
gap in maritime security is likely to remain a significant area of vulnerability into the 
foreseeable future, for a number of reasons.  
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Most African countries do not have coast guards, let alone blue-water navies. 
One of the major US Government initiatives to strengthen African security is to utilize 
US Navy and Coast Guard assets to help to train and equip African navies and coast 
guards. This is an ongoing project that has yet to yield results and any semblance of 
governance to the coast and littoral regions of Eastern and Western Africa. Security is 
also relatively lax in most African commercial ports. Kenya’s second largest city, 
Mombasa, is also the major port on the Eastern Coast. In 2006 and 2007, embassy-
based American survey teams noted significant problems in the security at the 
commercial port,50 but the Mombasa officials have been attempting to improve the 
gaps. The port now x-rays 20% of the containerized cargo that come through the port.51 
At the same time, there is virtually no security at the Old Port, where most dhow boats
dock (when they need dock at all, which often they do not). As most smugglers 
operating in the waters off of Kenya utilize dhows rather than containerized ships, this 
leaves open a broad hole in the security of the Mombasa port. Whether or not this wi
allow for the movement of large quantities of chemical agents in heavy barrels (for large 
quantities of VX, mustard or similar chemical agents) is open to question, but the dhows
have been noted for weapons, drug and human trafficking. The major increases in 





nt of such items.  
Finally, mapped onto all of these recognized vulnerabilities are the localized 
conflicts that exacerbate all of the above dynamics. Pastoral conflicts abound in Eastern 
and Sahelian Africa, creating disputes among local communities that span territorial 
boundaries and create cross-border disputes. The pastoral disputes generate a nexus 
of vulnerabilities: weapons flows, refugee movements, arms and people smuggling, and 
a further degradation of already weak (or nonexistent) governmental services. This lack 
of control and the climate of conflict create situations ripe for smuggling both SA/LW 
and WMD, whether precursor material or actual weapons.  Insofar as the localized 
conflicts interfere with local economies and local community self-help projects that 
supplement the dominant economy (in East Africa, cattle), the conflicts create local 
communities that are increasingly vulnerable and living in precarious situations. This will 
feed back into the conflict, while also making local communities more open to co-
optation by groups who wish to transport themselves and their materials through 
territories without detection, in exchange for food and other goods.  
Complicating the matter, government militaries are occasionally involved in the 
fighting, and they often take sides. Once the governments involve themselves as parties 
to the conflict, they forfeit the ability to act as a neutral party to end or mediate between 
local groups. Therefore, the conflicts will become even harder to solve, leaving a 
persistent, low-level vulnerability to terrorist movement in these areas. CEWARN 
reports document the incidents in depth,52 so one example will suffice here. Between 
May and August 2006, cross-border pastoral conflicts occurred between the Turkana 
tribe and the Ethiopian villages across the border. The Kenyan military supported the 
Turkana in their raids against the Ethiopians, increasing the chance that the local 
disputes could escalate into an international incident.   
 
Arguments Against Terrorism and Potential WMD Proliferation 
Despite these vulnerabilities and opportunities, however, there are compelling reasons 
why the nexus is not as threatening as it may appear. The issues come to targeting, 
capacity, ease/feasibility of transport, and motivation. Across all of these issues, the 
SA/LW threat is much more genuine than the likelihood that terrorists groups will 
become involved in the production, transport or use of biological, chemical or nuclear 
WMD in Africa. Given that the SA/LW problem affects localized conflicts and some inter-
state border issues, it is worth questioning the extent to which SA/LW and terrorism will 
ratchet up into a threat capable of threatening international and Western (or US) 
interests.  
First – what would be targeted? We need to think through where African WMD 
would go, what role the continent would play, etc. There are few large-scale 
industrialized interests on the African continent that would attract infrastructural attacks 
with nuclear or high-yield explosive weapons.  Most countries do not refine their own oil, 
which leaves petroleum-based targets to the resources utilized to extract crude oil. Most 
of these platforms are offshore, removing them from the immediate threat of overland-
based targeting. For chemical and biological weaponry, the targets would be human 
populations, and again there are few concentrations on the continent that would serve 
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as viable targets for anti-Western Islamist terrorists. Lagos, Johannesburg and Addis 
Ababa would be the possible exceptions to this analysis, and of those, Lagos is the 
most vulnerable to attack.  
Regarding capacity, it is questionable whether the industrial capacity exists in 
most countries to manufacture chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in the first place. 
Sudan’s al Shifa pharmaceutical plant, destroyed by the United States in 1998, had 
been suspected of producing precursors to VX, but the evidence was highly 
inconclusive and for the most part seemed to indicate that the facility had actually 
produced human and veterinary pharmaceuticals.53 South Africa decommissioned both 
its chemical and biological weapons programs in the late 1980s, reducing the capacity 
in that country as well. The country still retains dual-use vulnerability from its 
commercial pharmaceuticals plants, which could be pressed into the creation of 
chemical weapons.54 South Africa is the most extensively governed country on the 
continent, and while it does have a persistent crime problem, the extent of the 
vulnerabilities created by the ungoverned spaces paradigm elaborated in the first part of 
the paper are much less severe than in other countries.  
More importantly, Purkitt cautions that there are several poor countries in Africa 
that are developing civilian biotechnology research and production facilities that could 
produce sophisticated biotechnology products.  At this point in time, however, this 
remains in the realm of the possible rather than actual threat. Yet should African states 
or commercial interests attempt to produce chemical and biological weaponry from 
these facilities, both the infrastructural modifications and the enhanced security 
measures should be easily detectable. While it is theoretically possible to create 
chemical and biological weapons without specialized facilities, this would threaten the 
populations surrounding the locations and lead to retaliation. These facilities would also 
have to be located near sites with operating infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage 
and transport), which means they would not be sited in the peripheral ungoverned 
spaces that evade domestic government and international detection.  They would be 
more vulnerable to the grey areas of un-governance (those of political will), rather than 
the territorial dimension of lack of control.  A perhaps more genuine vulnerability from 
WMD and Ungoverned Spaces in Africa    26 
WMD and Ungoverned Spaces in Africa    27 
facilities such as those in South Africa would be through the diffusion of material into the 
commercial sectors, which presents a possible transport vulnerability.55  
African scientists and policy experts in this field are concerned about the 
potential release of biological agents, but do not consider their intentional use very 
likely. These specialists are more concerned with disease outbreaks rather than 
biological weapons. In May 2008, senior scientists from twelve Sub-Saharan African 
countries met at a regional biosecurity workshop in Pretoria. Following the event, they 
released a statement in which they stated, “In Africa, the primary concern is not the 
intentional misuse of science to cause harm, but rather, the risk to animal, plant and 
human health from natural disease outbreaks either originating on the continent or 
elsewhere.”56 The statement also indicated a concern with accidental contamination 
and the potential abuse of dual-use technologies, but the scientists argued that the 
benefits to advances in health care outweighed the risks. “It is recognised that t
nevertheless, a risk that human, plant or animal disease could be caused by an 
accidental or deliberate release of pathogens and products from laboratories.” 
here is, 
Referring back to the nature of terrorist groups in most of Africa and recalling that 
they are often fighting for localized freedoms and rights, this leads us to question 
whether these “terrorists” would seek to create biological or chemical weapons facilities 
that could harm the local populations that they represent. Harming these local 
populations is antithetical to both their ability to operate and the goals they seek to 
achieve. As many insurgent groups rely on local support, they are unlikely to risk 
alienating the local populations that provide them refuge and support and, when 
necessary, hide them from authorities. There is little motivation to use these weapons 
locally, and less to threaten their support bases by creating weapons to be utilized 
elsewhere. Therefore, the most basic kitchen-type facilities that can produce chemical 
and biological weapons are likely to be avoided. The one most notable potential 
exception to the logic of this argument is the larger-scale conflicts which generate the 
resource-seeking warlordism described by Reno in West Africa, and witnessed 
throughout the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In these cases, however, the risk of 
contaminating the ground from which the rebels draw the resources that make them rich 
could create the same constraint on their actions as those groups that rely on the 
support of local populations.  
Finally, one should question whether or not biological or chemical weapons 
would even be effective in Africa. Burgess and Purkitt have argued that few African 
security experts believe that chemical weapons would even be effective in Africa, “given 
the heat, and the possibility that shifting winds could blow agents onto one’s own troops. 
Biological weapons could be delivered through food and water, but the weapons could 
spread into one’s own population.”57 There is little motivation for terrorist groups to use 
these weapons on local populations to dabble in chemical, biological and nuclear WMD 
as opposed to SA/LW, which can be used in the immediate fight in the local arena more 
precisely, and with less chance of unanticipated effects. 
Given that there are few targets for biological, chemical and nuclear weapon use, 
and few for the creation of these weapons, it is worth considering transport challenges. 
If the biological and chemical weapons are intended for use outside the region, then the 
agents must be transported from the relatively governed city centers into the less 
formally governed areas in order to get it out of the country and into another one. This is 
where the political will aspect of ungoverned spaces becomes important – if public 
officials are bribable, this effort becomes more likely to succeed.  
Many of the larger airports in Africa have begun to utilize the Terrorist Interdiction 
Program (TIP) software, which increases surveillance capacity. Counter-narcotics 
measures in hubs such as the airports in Nairobi and Lagos further render smuggling 
more difficult than in previous periods. Most commercial transport within Africa takes 
place via air freight or shipping up and down the coasts, as the land-based 
infrastructure is poor to non-existent in many countries, or involves travel through or 
around large conflict zones. Air traffic is expensive, so only the well-funded terrorist 
groups would be able to utilize these networks, and there are few well-funded terrorist 
organizations operating in Africa.58 While this is a viable transportation route, more 
research would need to be done to assess how much of a genuine threat and 
opportunity it poses.  
One caveat to this skepticism regarding the likelihood that air transport could or 
would be utilized by terrorists to transport WMD pertains to the khat (chat, qatt, etc) 
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trade throughout East Africa, from Kenya through Sudan and into Yemen. The planes 
that transport khat from Yemen into Djibouti, Kenya into Ethiopia and Djibouti, etc, are 
not often subject to strict customs controls or inspections, as delaying the daily delivery 
of khat tends to cause social unrest. Taking advantage of this, Al-Qaeda has utilized 
khat planes to smuggle small arms and weapons, personnel and perhaps money,59 and 
the potential could therefore to also transfer biological, chemical or nuclear precursors 
or weapons. There is no evidence that such transport has occurred, but it is an 
opportunity that should be considered.  
If terrorists are taking advantage of the ungoverned areas of Africa to transport 
biological, chemical or nuclear WMD, then the routing will unfold either over inadequate 
roads or in rickety, small boats like the dhows. Overland travel has significant 
drawbacks for transporting WMD. Roads in most countries are heavily potholed and 
threat of banditry is high, even on major highways. Transport into the peripheral rural 
regions involves heavily degraded tar or dirt roads where the terrain is rough. Trucks 
often break down and/or mysteriously lose cargo. Delivery times are unreliable, which 
means that shipments could not be timed with any precision. The unreliability of the 
roads means that goods that need to be refrigerated – as do many biological weapons – 
may not survive long enough in transport; and those that require stasis in transport 
could be compromised while transported in this method.  Stable forms of uranium are 
less vulnerable to these forms of transport.  
If goods go through non-formal crossings (i.e., most crossings in the deepest of 
the ungoverned areas), then they could be transported via nomadic caravan routes, en 
even more precarious situation than relying on the poor road system. The risks of 
contaminating the product, the people carrying it, and the areas through which it is 
being transported increases further. Most of the railroads in these countries are non 
functional, eliminating that method of transport (for example, the existing rail systems in 
Nigeria and Ethiopia do not currently operate, which means that products exit the 
countries via overland trucks or airplane). These risks do not pose as much of a threat 
to the transport of small arms and light weaponry, which is one reason why the SA/LW 
threat in Africa is very prevalent in many areas and a much more genuine threat to 
proliferation and terrorism than chemical, biological and nuclear terrorism.  
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 Way Forward 
This paper is by nature more speculative than assessing actual threats on the ground. 
Little is known about the various local terrorist groups that operate within the 
ungoverned regions of Africa, aside from their basic motivations. Therefore, there are 
many areas for future research that DTRA-ASCO might want to pursue in the future on 
this subject.  
− A deeper investigation of ways that WMD can be produced, and of the African 
particularities here. While WMD seems an unlikely threat at present, the steady 
development of biological research and production facilities, and the interest in 
uranium exploration could open up opportunities for exploitation.  
− Full investigation of the practicalities of transport across very difficult terrain, 
which could easily compromise the integrity of biological and chemical material 
and weapons containers. Uranium ore is the most likely precursor material to find 
its way out of Africa through the ungoverned spaces, and is worth monitoring. 
Nuclear weapons would be more readily transported than biological or chemical 
weapons, but at this stage are the least likely form of WMD to be found on the 
continent.  
− Concrete mapping of facilities, groups, and specific locations where this all could 
take place, and then comprehensive analysis of the implications. 
Overall, there is not much of an actual WMD proliferation threat at present. It’s more of 
a worry of what could be done should a group wish to, and on that front, the academics, 
policymakers and government officials all agree that if a group should want to transport 
WMD through Africa, it would be possible. The question becomes, where would they 
take it, are they intending to use the WMD on the continent or in other areas of the 
world, and how does this affect the threat calculations? Much of that is likely to be 
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